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Abstract 
 This paper establishes a model to forecast the Presidential election outcomes, 
particularly the 2016 United States Presidential Election by analyzing two distinctive 
approaches: predicting election wins through voting function, and using approval ratings 
as proxy for votes.  I examine and replicate previous models for vote share of the 
Democratic Party and of the government for elections from 1948 to 2012. Then, I 
construct a model for approval ratings based on economic and non-economic variables. 
My findings have direct implications for forecasting elections and the political business 
cycle. 
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I. Introduction 
Every four years the American electorate makes an important decision: late in the 
year, the political leader of the world is announced. This typically has far reaching 
strategic and economic consequences. The evening of November 8, 2016 will be no 
different. Throughout the election process so far, Hillary Clinton has been the clear leader 
for the nomination of the Democratic Party, performing confidently behind the podium at 
debates. There is little doubt that she will be one of the two candidates for President. At 
the same time, the Republican Party has struggled to find a strong, leading candidate to 
represent the party. Although the Republican candidate will not likely be chosen until 
next summer, various election models and forecasters have predicted the Republican 
Party to win the 2016 Presidential election. President Rubio or Cruz? 
Forecasting election outcomes has been capturing significant interest among 
voters, academics (primarily social scientists), and the news media. Theories to predict 
the election winners range from detailed economic models to nonsense correlations.  The 
Redskins Rule, for example, holds that if the Redskins won their last home game before 
the election, the incumbent party will stay in power
1
.  Many studies in political economy 
attempt to identify determinants of the presidential election, using both economic and 
non-economic variables. However, it is natural to ask why economists would be 
interested in analyzing voting preferences. 
                                                          
1
 There is the occasional exception, such as in 2000, when George W. Bush was not declared the winner 
until late in January 2001. Also, the country so far only has had male presidents. However, this could 
change with the upcoming election given that the likely candidate of the Democrats is a female for the first 
time in the history of the country. Finally, it is the Electoral College that technically elects the President of 
the U.S. 
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One approach is based on the original idea of the political business cycle, first 
formally introduced by Nordhaus (1975).
2
 This phenomenon includes “cycles in 
macroeconomic variables –output, unemployment, inflation – induced by the electoral 
cycles resulting from leaders having different policy objectives” (Nordhaus 1975, 42). 
The interaction between economic variables (here inflation and unemployment), election 
votes, and government policy instruments generates business cycles to win elections in a 
politico-economic framework. The underlying assumption is that Presidents have the 
ability, during the pre-election phase, to manipulate government instruments such as 
government expenditure, taxes, and perhaps even monetary policy so as to create a 
booming economy during the election years and thereby to increase their chances of 
staying in power. An earlier and different approach is taken by Downs (1957), who 
applies economic theory to non-market political decision-making. Previously, the process 
of government decision making had not been considered when analyzing decision 
making with private agents; instead the government sector was generally considered to be 
exogenous in economic models. However, Downs hypothesized that “political parties in a 
democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes.” As a result, the 
government “always acts to maximize the number of votes it will receive” (Downs 1957, 
137). 
The purpose of this thesis is to forecast the Presidential election outcomes in 
general, but with a special eye on the 2016 event. This will be done through the use of a 
variety of models, taking into account both vote shares and presidential approval ratings. 
First I examine the relationship between vote share functions and economic variables, 
                                                          
2
 Interestingly enough, Nordhaus served on the Council of Economic advisors from 1977 under President 
Carter 
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using both Fair’s (1978) published model and Silver’s (2011) alternative specification. 
The latter incorporates approval ratings during the fourth year of a presidency as an 
explanatory variable. Lastly I estimate presidential approval ratings by using the 
popularity function approach made popular by, inter alia, Frey and Schneider (1976) and 
Kramer (1971). These can be used either as a direct predictor of election outcomes, or to 
provide but one input into voting functions. The ultimate purpose of these models will be 
to name the likely winner of the 2016 election, which I will do in the concluding section, 
where I will also point to shortcomings and future research avenues. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Prior to the early 1970s, little literature existed regarding the impact of economic 
variables on presidential vote and presidential popularity functions in the U.S. and 
elsewhere. Kramer (1971) was one of the first who looked for the effect of economic 
fluctuations on congressional elections. He studied 31 elections for Congress between 
1896 and 1964 and concluded that economic indicators have an important influence on 
congressional elections. More specifically, his model showed that real personal income 
was the most important economic variable in predicting outcomes with an R
2
 of 0.66. 
With a ten percent decrease in real personal income per-capita, Kramer’s model 
suggested a five percentage point decrease in congressional votes for the incumbents. The 
major innovation of his research was that voting preferences did not solely depend on 
prior habits or random decisions, but that they were influenced significantly by economic 
fluctuations, with an economic boom benefitting the incumbent party’s congressional 
candidate and a decline benefitting the opposition party candidate. While the result is 
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itself of interest, note that finding incumbency inherently providing little benefit to the 
ruling party unless the economy is performing well. However if the incumbent were able 
to implement policies that will influence the economy in a way that would increase 
popularity for the incumbent party for the upcoming election, then surely they would 
attempt to do so, thereby creating economic fluctuations to win the election (“political 
business cycle”). 
This first connection between the economy and government support is measured 
through voting functions for presidential elections and so-called popularity functions. For 
the U.S., the latter are represented by presidential approval ratings typically measured 
through Gallup polls. There is a large literature on the subject, but conveniently 
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) provide an early survey of the most relevant papers. The 
authors conclude that voters reward the government for good economic performance and 
punish it for poor performance. Hence there is symmetry. A voting function attempts to 
explain vote shares while a popularity function assumes that presidential approval ratings 
can be translated to voter preferences for the upcoming election. The advantage of using 
vote share is that it is accurately portraying the outcome of an election. However, the 
number of observations is limited to the number of presidential elections: 100 years of 
observations only result in 25 data points resulting in a low number of degrees of 
freedom and hence potential problems with statistical inference. Thus, if popularity could 
accurately predict vote share, then popularity function would be the preferable method. 
One of the most influential players in the field of vote functions is Ray Fair, who 
periodically makes popular press predictions based on his voting function model. The 
original publication is Fair (1978). The model developed here is intended to predict the 
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Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote using economic factors, incumbency 
variables, and the external effects such as wars. The economic variables analyzed include 
the growth rate of real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation as measured 
through the growth rate of the GDP deflator, and the number of quarters that growth rate 
of real per capita GDP is greater than 3.2 percent (a so-called “good news” effect). The 
model explains a remarkable 90 percent of the variation in the vote share, and all the 
coefficients except for the incumbency variable are significant at the five percent level. 
The Democratic presidential candidate receives 0.67 points more of the vote for every 
percentage point increase in real per capita GDP. The incumbent nominee loses 0.70 
points for every one percentage point increase in inflation. Every good news quarter adds 
almost one percentage point for the incumbent party. 
When examining popularity function, polling data is available almost every two 
weeks, allowing for higher frequency data. Having more observations is important 
because it allows for more determinants of voting preferences to be tested. Clearly you 
would have to make adjustments during the earlier years of the presidency, when voters 
in the U.S. do not have the opportunity to compare the president’s performance with an 
alternative candidate - in this sense, approval ratings in the U.S. differ from those in 
many other countries, where the leader of the opposition is also the most likely 
opposition candidate for the next election. Certain adjustments have to be made to 
account for this fact if approval functions are to be used as a proxy for voting function. 
Some authors, e.g. Frey and Schneider (1978), have introduced some sort of honeymoon 
variable with a subsequent depreciation, and a “fear of change” variable to characterize 
recurring movements back to the incumbent as elections approach. At the same time, 
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popularity functions also allow for the specification of an inherent popularity of a 
president by designating dummy variables for each administration. 
Mueller (1970) actually introduced popularity functions a year before Kramer’s 
publication on voting functions. Similar to Fair’s model, the Mueller’s specification 
explained a high degree 986 percent) of the variation. This is remarkable for a time series 
where the LHS variable is not trended, but stationary. Mueller’s model only contained 
unemployment as the single economic variable. His prediction was that for every 
percentage point increase in unemployment there would be a three percentage point 
decline in popularity of the incumbent president. To put matters into perspective, there 
has been a five percentage point decline in the unemployment rate during the last six 
years of the Obama administration. Mueller added other non-economic events on the 
RHS of his equation, such as wars, scandals, and international crises, finding that they 
have a significant impact on a president’s popularity. In the short term, an international 
crisis boosts a president’s popularity. However, unlike Kramer’s conclusion, Mueller 
concludes that the effects of economic performance are significant only when the 
economy is performing badly, while a booming economy does not significantly improve 
the president’s approval ratings. 
Other scholars also shared Mueller’s approach on non-economic events. Frey and 
Schneider probably have the most publications in the field, especially considering their 
many cross country specifications. For the U.S., Frey and Schneider (1978) argued that 
both economic and non-economic variables are important determinants of presidential 
popularity. Different from Mueller, who only showed a single economic variable 
affecting approval ratings in his model, Frey and Schneider found a variety of economic 
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variables to have a significant influence. The authors studied the effects of three 
economic variables, unemployment, inflation, and growth of income, taking into account 
potential multicollinearity between them. Inflation, for example reduces the president’s 
popularity by 1.7 percentage points for every percentage point increase. Frey and 
Schneider concluded that personality influences represent important non-economic 
determinants. Each president’s individual characteristics were measured through the 
inclusion of a dummy variable. Other political events, such as the Watergate scandal, also 
seem to be important. 
Monroe and Laughlin (1983) disagreed with Frey and Schneider’s conclusion 
regarding the relevant importance of the various influences. The authors found that the 
unemployment was the single most important variable with a one percentage increase in 
unemployment rate resulting in a decrease of 6.6 percentage points in presidential 
popularity. In addition, Monroe and Laughlin found instability across party lines 
regarding the specification: during Republican presidents, there was a regression R
2 
of 
0.84 while Democratic presidents showed a lower regression R
2
 value of 0.70. This 
difference in explanatory power suggests that political party affiliation of the incumbent 
plays a critical role regarding on the influence that unemployment plays on presidential 
popularity. Monroe and Laughlin were among the first scholars to raise the importance of 
partisanship as a determinant of the public’s response to economic events. 
           Monroe’s and Laughlin’s findings were contrary to research conducted by Fox and 
Phillips (2003). These two authors found that unemployment was more significant in 
affecting presidential popularity when the incumbent was a Democrat, rather than a 
Republican. Fox and Phillips concluded that Democratic presidents were viewed as more 
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unemployment-averse than Republicans. Hence voter attitudes appeared more sensitive to 
unemployment during Democratic administrations. 
Norpoth (1984) expounded on the importance of understanding how time lags 
affect the way that various economic and non-economic determinants impact on 
presidential popularity. His study employed stochastic time series models using quarterly 
data from 1961 to 1980. Norpoth showed that changes in inflation rates lagged one 
quarter and had a significant effect on presidential popularity. For quarterly 
unemployment rates, however, no lag was necessary. Similar to other authors, Norpoth 
also stated that presidential popularity is subject to an independent electoral cycle, and 
each president begins with a “honeymoon effect” when there is unearned popularity that 
is later diminished throughout the term quarters.  Non-economic variables such as 
significant and atypical occurrences were important only in the short run; their long run 
repercussions on presidential popularity are less notable. 
Realizing that voters known as “floaters” are more easily swayed by candidates’ 
ideological positions, Zaller (2004) focuses on utilizing surveys to measure presidential 
vote choice. “Floaters” are the low information voters who may not necessarily be loyal 
to one political party but are more responsive to be persuaded through the political 
content of the elections. The low information/less strongly attached voters determine 
voting preferences according to the “nature of the times” and candidate qualities. 
One particular variable that Zaller examines is the measure of the candidate’s 
ideology in relation to the ideological position of the average voter. From reviewing the 
surveys of voter responses (American National Election Survey or ANES), Zaller 
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concluded that voters were more sensitive to extreme candidates and would consequently 
be less likely to vote for those candidates. 
More recently, Silver (2011) utilizes the ideology of the candidates that Zaller 
examined to forecast presidential elections through vote share of the government. Silver 
understands that Americans review the performance of the current president as being 
reflective of how voters view the incumbent party. As a result, approval ratings of the 
incumbent (during the election year) is the first determinant in Silver’s model. The 
second factor is the economic performance measured through real GDP growth during 
the election year. The last factor is the ideological position of the opposition party 
candidate. Although the model incorporates economic and non-economic variables, it 
does not consider the difference between popular vote and the Electoral College. In 
addition, the model is very dependent on the survey response and those responses may 
differ from reality. 
Although vote functions have been frequently estimated, Nannestad and Paldam 
(1994) conclude that vote functions are unstable analytical tools because it requires a 
sufficient political component of the model and only works within narrow variation for 
the explanatory variables. Thus, the model is unstable across time and countries. The 
degree that the government is responsible plays an important in the degree of how voters 
attempt to shift the blame and claim the credit of the economic conditions. Because of the 
many variables, the only strict way to control for the variations is to model cross country 
differences explicitly and have all else equal. 
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II. Data Construction and Results 
Three different models are examined: Ray Fair Model, Nate Silver Model, and 
Keil-Lin Model. For the Ray Fair Model that predicts the Democrat vote share, I first 
replicate the results for the election years 1916 to 2012 and 1948 to 2012. Then, I modify 
the model by incorporating the change in unemployment rate instead of the economic 
variable in Fair’s model. Lastly, I forecast for the 2016 election using the original Fair 
model but using different scenarios for the economic variables.  
 For the Nate Silver Model, I replicate the results according to the three factors 
found in a New York Times article that predicts the vote share of the government in the 
election year from 1948 to 2012. After replicating the model, I forecast for the 2016 
election using different assumptions for the variables. The major difference between Fair 
and Silver’s model is that Silver incorporates a variable that is specific to the candidate of 
the election year. 
 For the Keil-Lin Model, instead of predicting vote share which is conducted in 
Fair and Silver’s model, I create a model to predict quarterly presidential approval ratings 
using a more comprehensive approach of four economic variables and four types of 
dummy variables. I explain the variables used in the unrestricted model and the solved 
restricted model. Then, I forecast the 2016 election approval ratings and incorporate those 
approval ratings to the Silver model to predict the 2016 vote share. Lastly, I perform 
different test the model for robustness and stability. 
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A.1 Ray Fair Model Data 
To replicate the Ray Fair model, the incumbent share of the two-party presidential 
vote and House vote were the dependent variables. The independent variables included 
dummy variables called party (I), person (DPER), duration (DUR), and war (WAR). The 
party variable indicated that if there is a Democratic incumbent at the time of the election, 
it would be assigned a 1 and a -1 if there is a Republican incumbent. For the person 
variable, if the incumbent is running then it would be assigned a 1 and 0 otherwise. For 
the duration variable, the incumbent party in power for one term would receive 0, 1 if the 
incumbent party has been in power for two consecutive terms, 1.25 for three consecutive 
terms, 1.50 for four consecutive terms, etc. For the war variable, the election years of 
1920, 1944 and 1948 were assigned 1 and 0 otherwise. The continuous variables of 
growth, inflation, and good news were also determined to be influential. The growth rate 
variable (G) is the annual growth rate of real per capita GDP in the first three quarters of 
the election year, or real disposable personal income (RDPI). The inflation variable (P) is 
the absolute value of the growth rate of the GDP deflator in the first 15 quarters, except 
for 1920, 1944, and 1948 when the values are zero. The good news variable (Z) is 
defined as the number of quarters in the first 15 quarters of the administration in which 
growth rate of real per capita GDP is greater than 3.2 percent, except for 1920, 1944 and 
19948 when values are zero. However, the good news variable is also later modified to 
the number of quarters in the first 15 quarters of the administration in which the growth 
rate of real per capita GDP is greater than 2.2 percent to reflect the brave new world 
perspective that inflation is not as high as previous levels.  
 
12 
 
The Ray Fair Model is: 
                                                             
 (0.60) (0.12) (0.30) (0.24) (1.41) (1.22) (2.22)  (2.54) 
 
                                
                                                               
 (0.68) (0.23) (0.32) (0.33) (2.14) (1.77) (2.92)  (3.98) 
  
                                
His model assumed that inflation and GDP would be the economic variables that 
would be relevant for Democrat vote shares. However, according to Okun’s law, there is 
a relationship between an economy’s unemployment rate and GDP. To test this 
relationship, I took out the GDP and replaced it with the annualized change in 
unemployment quarterly rates. The relationship between the change in unemployment 
rate and GDP and the relationship between the change unemployment rate and RDPI is 
shown below and also in Figure 1: 
                                                      (2.2) 
                                                                                          
                                                        (2.3) 
                                                                  
 Figure 1 displays how GDP and the change unemployment rate are related. They 
are seen to be negatively correlated with one percent increase in GDP results in 0.38 
percent decrease in unemployment rate. When evaluating the difference between RDPI 
and GDP, GDP is one percent higher to achieve the same level of RDPI. In equation 
(2.2), GDP growth of 4.2 percent is necessary to constitute as a good news quarter. This 
results in the change of unemployment rate to be decrease in 0.3 percent. For equation 
(2.3), the quarter is considered good news if it exceeds 3.2 percent, which results in the 
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change in unemployment rate to also decrease by 0.3 percent. This decrease in 
unemployment rate means that for each month, unemployment rate needs to decrease by 
0.1 percent, which is likely. Using the change in unemployment rate gives the model 
shown below:  
                                                          
 (0.95) (0.55) (0.49) (0.81) (3.04) (1.22) (2.22)  (2.54) 
 
                                
                                                              
 (1.21) (0.64) (0.69) (01.34) (3.80) (3.00) (11.78)  (6.28) 
 
                               
 Although the regression with unemployment has a slightly smaller R-square, 
unemployment rate is more indicative. Converting the GDP in a booming economy of 5 
percent to unemployment rate yields a negative 0.6 percent in change in unemployment 
rate in one quarter. Using this assumption, the Democrat vote share is above 50. 
Replacing unemployment rate with GDP improves the ideology and inflation variable 
because the coefficients are now higher and have a greater impact on vote- share. A 
higher ideology variable means a larger ideology difference between the general public 
and the opposition party candidate, and the larger the ideology difference, the higher the 
probability that the incumbent will win the reelection. 
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A.2 Ray Fair Model Results 
Using the assumptions of the economy found in Ray Fair’s 2014 update, the 
forecast for the 2016 election is found in Table 1. Given the normal economy 
assumptions, the Democrat vote share is less than 50 in both cases when good news 
variable is adjusted. For the booming economy assumptions, the Democrat vote share 
would exceed 50 when the good news variable is adjusted for post-publication and the 
quarter is considered good news if it exceeds 2.2 percent instead of 3.2 percent. However, 
in the slow growth economy assumptions, the Democrat share is also below 50. Post-
publication adjustments for the good news variable are necessary because I currently 
have more information about the economy’s performance than what was available to Fair 
when he was forecasting the 2016 election. For example, in 2014 when Fair was updating 
his model for the 2016 election, it was possible for GDP to exceed 3.2 percent for more 8 
quarters, which constitutes an 8 for good news variable. To reflect the current 2015 third 
quarter GDP growth of the economy, the good news variable is decreased because it is no 
longer possible to have 8 quarters of GDP growth exceeding 3.2%.  
Using the assumptions of the economy provided by the UCLA Anderson 
Forecast, the Democrat vote share would be found in Table 2. The Ray Fair model is used 
to forecast the 2016 election votes-share. The model from 1916 to 2012 results in a 48.50 
Democrat vote share while the 1948 to 2012 results in a 44.81 Democrat vote share. 
Although Fair’s model accounts for economic variables, it doesn’t look at the variables 
that relate to the candidate. As a result, if Adolf Hitler were running in Ray Fair’s model, 
the candidate would not make a difference. The only determinants would be the current 
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state of the economy. As a result, I look at Nate Silver’s model that looks at the qualities 
of the opponent.  
 
B.1 Nate Silver Model Data 
In Nate Silver’s model, the main factors are the approval ratings, GDP, and 
ideology of opposition party candidates. The presidential approval ratings came from the 
University of California Santa Barbara’s database of Gallup polling data. Although the 
data was presented on a weekly frequency, I took the average approval ratings from the 
year before the third quarter of the election year to retrieve the approval ratings in the 
year before the election year. However, there was no data available before 1950, so the 
approval ratings variable span from 1952 to 2012. Figure 2 displays the approval ratings 
over the years. The annual real GDP were secured from Federal Reserve of Economic 
Data (FRED).  
Lastly, the ideology score of the opposition party candidate is derived from two 
different methods. Silver receives the score from Zaller (2004) who scales a candidate 
from negative 3 with the most conservative position, positive 3 with the most liberal 
position, and 0 was the midpoint. Zaller initially retrieves the score a candidate according 
to the American National Election Studies (ANES) where voters are surveyed on a scale 
of 1 to 7 rating of the candidates’ ideology, with 1 being extremely liberal and 7 being 
extremely conservative. Zaller provides the score from 1948 to 2004, so the ideology 
score for 2008 and 2012 were estimated. I looked at the ANES survey for every election 
year from 1972 to 2004 to replicate the ideology score that Zaller provides. ANES 
provided the number of respondents who rated a candidate’s ideological position on a 
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scale of 1 to 7, so I found the weight of each score by taking the number of respondents 
for one score divided by the total number of respondents for the candidate. The weights 
were multiplied by the score on the negative 3 to positive 3 scale and added together to 
get the total rating of the candidate. These calculated ideology scores were compared 
with the scores Zaller provides. Figure 3 plots the ANES and Zaller ideology scores for 
every election year from 1972 to 2004. The ANES scores are consistently higher than 
Zaller scores and the difference between the two scores seem to be consistent as well. 
Figure 4 explains the relationship between ANES scores and Zaller scores with the R-
square of 0.72. The data points fall close to the regression line, which shows that the 
ANES scores calculated has a strong relationship with the Zaller scores and can be used 
to predict the ideology scores for the missing election years of 2008 and 2012. Using the 
methodology described earlier, I found that 2004 opposition party candidate had an 
ideology score of 1.1 and 1.8 in 2008. The model is shown below: 
                                     
 (4.78) (0.07) (0.43) (0.08) 
 
                                
 
B.2 Nate Silver Model Results 
The most important difference between Fair and Silver’s model is that Silver 
incorporates an ideology variable. In order to forecast the ideology of the opposition 
candidate, I asked three professors from the Claremont Colleges what their impression of 
what the general public would rank the Republican candidates on a scale of 0 to 100. A 
score of 100 would mean that the candidate is extremely conservative. The Republican 
candidates in question include Jed Bush, Mark Rubio, Donald Trump, Ben Carson, Carly 
Fiorina, Ted Cruz, Rand Paul, and John Kasich. The scores from the three professors 
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were averaged to retrieve the score for the opposition candidates. In Table 3, the results 
of the Republican candidate ideology are shown. The average ideology score for the 
candidates range from 49.7 to 89.7, which gives an average of about 70 for the eight 
candidates.  
As a result, when using the Silver model to forecast the 2016 election, the 
ideology of opposition candidates are examined in three different ideology scenarios: 50, 
60, 70, and 80. The GDP assumptions regarding the economy of normal, boom, and slow 
growth conditions are from Fair’s model discussed before. The approval ratings of 
President Obama from 2008 and 2015 are displayed in Figure 5. The average approval 
rating for Obama is 47.43, so a range of 40, 50, and 60 for approval ratings were taken 
into account in the forecast.  
The results are shown in Table 4 where shaded regions represent the scenarios 
when the vote share of the government, which is currently the Democratic Party, is above 
50. There is only one scenario when the Democratic vote share is less than 50. This is 
when there is slow growth, the president approval rating is 40, and the ideology of the 
Republican candidate is 50. The Democrat vote share increases to 51.38 when the 
candidate’s ideology increases to 60. This shows that the ideology of the candidate 
impacts the vote share of the government, something that the Fair model does not 
incorporate. In all other scenarios, the Democratic Party is above 50. 
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C.1 Keil-Lin Model Data 
In this model, the presidential popularity function model, the Gallup poll of 
presidential approval ratings was the dependent variable. The independent variables 
included change in real GDP, unemployment rate, inflation, significant events that would 
affect presidential popularity, terms of each president, changes in political party, and 
quarterly variables. GDP, unemployment rate, and inflation were continuous variables 
while the remaining variables are dummy variables also aimed to discover to what extent 
these variables influenced the dependent variable. For the dummy variables, we assigned 
a 1 for quarters where the event was in effect and a 0 otherwise.   
All data for the presidential popularity function model was collected and 
compared on a quarterly basis. During any scenario where data was missing, we averaged 
the available period data. The data for approval ratings were from the University of 
California Santa Barbara’s database of Gallup polling data, and they are averaged for 
every quarter. All economic data and quarterly figures for GDP, unemployment rate, and 
inflation were secured from the Federal Reserve of Economic Data (FRED). The real 
GDP growth rate is taken from the growth rate of GDP in billions of chained 2009 
dollars. The unemployment rate is presented in quarterly rates from FRED. The inflation 
rate is found through the percent change in Consumer Price Index (CPI) from FRED on a 
quarterly basis. Events which we deemed would be influential for approval ratings were 
gleaned from historical analysis of each president’s term and comparison against 
available public perception data related to the event or comparison against approval 
ratings during the affected time period. These events included 9/11 and the Watergate 
scandal. Wars were accounted for separately with dummy variables to account for the 
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periods which we determined them to have significant influence on perceptions of the 
president.  
To ensure that the variables are stationary in a time series regression, the three 
continuous variables are tested. When running the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF) 
on these three variables: Gallup poll ratings, GDP, and unemployment rate, they would 
be considered stationary if I could reject the null hypothesis for each variable. The ADF 
test calculates a test statistic for whether the unit root is equal to zero under the null 
hypothesis and less than zero for the alternative hypothesis. The results are shown in 
Table 5. The critical values for significance at the five percent level is -2.87 and -3.46 for 
the one percent level. Therefore, all the variables are significant at the one percent level 
except for the log of GDP
3
. As a result, Gallup poll ratings, GDP, and unemployment rate 
variables are stationary. 
The Granger Causality test is important to test whether one variable in a time 
series possesses statistically significant information to predict the future values of another 
variable. The test lags the independent variable against the dependent variable and tests 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient of each lag is equal to zero. Four lags were tested 
and the F-statistics of the Gallup poll, inflation, and unemployment rate variables are 
displayed in Table 6. There is evidence that economic variables Granger Cause Gallup. 
The CPI does not Granger Cause Gallup, and the unemployment rate variable cannot 
reject that Gallup cannot Granger Cause. Gallup poll ratings can be rejected at the five 
percent level. This suggests that besides Gallup’s own lagged past, economic variables 
receive control in predicting Gallup poll ratings. 
                                                          
3
 While the difference between the log of GDP and the first lag of the log of GDP is stationary, the actual 
variable in the solved restricted model is the third difference of the lag of the log of GDP. It also appears to 
be stationary but results are not reported. 
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I also performed a Lagrange Multiplier test on the final regression. Given the fact 
that I used quarterly data in the regression, I tested the first and fourth order of 
autocorrelation. The data rejects the null hypothesis of serial correlation at the two 
percent level for the fourth order. I could not reject autocorrelation at the one percent 
level for the first order. Given the potential problems that autocorrelation causes with 
statistical inferences, I re-estimated the model using heteroskedasticity and HAC standard 
errors (Newey West standard errors). The major difference in my results was the annual 
inflation no longer appears to be statistically significant.  
I also experimented with including a second lag of the dependent variable Gallup 
poll ratings, but it did not alleviate the problem of autocorrelation. This would have to be 
examined through further research. 
To test for stability, I used the Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) Statistic to 
maximize Chow statistics. The Chow test statistic tests the hypothesis of no break in 
coefficients to detect structural change. My model contains a break if there is a change in 
intercept or change in slope in the coefficients tested. The Stability Analysis leaves out 
points when administration changes and I am aware of structural breaks at these points 
due to the fact that approval ratings are trying to forecast the new president’s first 
approval ratings with the predecessor’s last approval ratings. Following Pissarides 
(1972), I have dealt with this behavior by dummying out that observation each time the 
political party changes. In addition, I have also tested for the Q4 variable that allows for 
the intercept to change for every point. The results are displayed in Figure 6. The five 
percent critical value is 3.66 and the coefficients are the Q5 and Q4 variables plotted. 
While the model behaves well in general, there seems to be a few periods, particularly in 
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President H. W. Bush era where the model appears to be a structural break. Trying to fix 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In addition, I also conducted a stability test where I allowed coefficients of 
economic variables to vary by administration. This differs from the previously reported 
test in the sense that I do not allow coefficients to change one period at a time. I feel that 
this test is more indicative of the model. The F-statistic for the model without time effects 
is 4.22, so I found to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
C.2 Keil-Lin Model Results 
When forming the regression, the lags of the Gallup poll ratings and the economic 
variables were taken to test the time series analysis where the approval ratings depend on 
the previous period economic variables. By utilizing lagged variables, the data can show 
which lagged variables are important and plausible restrictions can be made to adjust the 
model. Results of the Gallup poll ratings and economic variables are presented in Table 7 
with the unrestricted model in the first column and the solved restricted form in the 
second column. The unrestricted model contains four lags for the four economic 
variables, lag of Gallup poll, and all the dummy variables. In the terminology of David 
Hendry and LSE specification search methodology, I refer to the solved restricted form as 
the significant lags of the economic variables, lag of Gallup poll, and all the dummy 
variables.  
In the unrestricted model, the lag of Gallup is statistically significant in the one 
percent level with the coefficient 0.62, meaning that the every one point increase 
approval ratings from the previous quarter increases the current approval ratings by 0.62. 
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The lag of Gallup poll ratings has the similar significant effect in the solved restricted 
form with the coefficient also being 0.62.  
The log of CPI and its four lags do not appear to be significant in the ten, five, and 
one percent level but the log of CPI and the second lag of log of CPI have t-statistic of 
greater than 1 in the unrestricted model. With the solved restricted form, the log of CPI 
and its four lags are significant in the ten percent level. The variable that took difference 
of the log of CPI and the fourth lag of log of CPI was generated to capture the 
significance of the annual change of CPI. The variable that took the log of CPI subtracted 
from two times the first lag of the log of CPI plus the second lag of the log of CPI was 
generated to show the change of the change in CPI. This can be interpreted as the moving 
average of CPI throughout the quarters.  
In the unrestricted model, the log of GDP and the third lag of the log of GDP are 
significant on the one percent level, but the other lags are not significant. The coefficients 
for the log of GDP and the third lag of the log of GDP are similar but have opposite 
effects with 127.7 and negative 124.8, respectively. In the solved restricted form, the 
variable that accounts for the three quarter growth rate is generated to show the 
significance of the lagged variables. This is taken from the difference in the log of GDP 
and the third lag of the log of GDP. It results in a 67.4 and negative 67.4 coefficient for 
the log of GDP and the third lag of the log of GDP respectively. 
The unemployment rate and all of its lags except the fourth lag are insignificant in 
the unrestricted model. As a result, the solved restricted model only has the first lag of 
unemployment rate and is significant on the one percent level. The coefficient is negative 
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1.28 so a one percent increase in the previous quarter’s unemployment rate decreases the 
current approval ratings by 1.28 points.  
The first non-economic variable that pertains to the presidency is the term quarter 
variables. Similar to the honeymoon effect, the term variables have a high positive 
coefficient in the beginning of presidency, decrease throughout the term, and rise towards 
the end of the term. Figure 7 displays this trend with each president with 16 terms to 
signify each quarter for four years.  
The presidential dummy variable is to differentiate each president’s inherent 
personality and effects on approval ratings. The results are presented in Figure 8. The 
president possesses a higher intrinsic popularity with a higher coefficient when other 
variables are held constant. In the solved restricted form, most of the coefficients for the 
presidents were significant on the one percent level. Although the degree of increase in 
approval ratings varies, the coefficients for each president are important determinants of 
approval ratings. President Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan have 
some of the highest personality coefficients, while President W. Bush and Nixon have the 
least intrinsic popularity in the second term. Presidents in the second term also received a 
lower coefficient when compared to the first term approval ratings. When comparing the 
coefficients between the unrestricted model and the solved restricted model that controls 
for pertinent economic variables, president coefficients frequently increased in the solved 
restricted model. For example, in the unrestricted form, President Nixon in his first term 
has a coefficient of 11.52 but in the solved restricted form, he receives a coefficient of 
16.92. The approval ratings increased after poor economic variables were controlled 
because the public attributes approval to his individual personality. 
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The non-economic variable for the change in political party is important because 
when there is a change in political party, the incumbent’s political party cannot predict 
the incoming president’s approval ratings. Most of the coefficients in the solved restricted 
form are significant on a one percent level with a positive coefficient. This result is 
expected because the last approval ratings of the president leaving office should be lower 
than the incoming president’s approval ratings. If the incumbent’s party has high 
approval ratings, then it is expected that there would be no change in political party. 
The events have positive and negative effects on approval ratings depending on 
the nature of the event. In the Appendix, the events variable is explained where Vietnam 
War and the Watergate Scandal were events that negatively influenced the presidential 
approval ratings, which means that the public disagreed with these events. However, the 
Kuwait War and the 9/11 attacks have a positive coefficient because the public believed 
that the president’s actions were beneficial and prudent. 
 
C.3 Keil-Lin Model Forecasts 
To forecast for the 2016 presidential election, two approaches are conducted. The 
first approach directly uses Gallup poll ratings as a proxy for vote share of the incumbent 
party. This approach utilizes the Keil-Lin Model, which incorporates economic and 
personality factors that help predict the election. The second approach is to predict the 
election wins through voting functions. This approach utilizes the Silver Model that uses 
Gallup poll ratings as one of the determinants of vote share of the government.  
With the first approach, if approval ratings during the last quarter of presidency 
are above 50, then the incumbent party is predicted to win the election. This approach has 
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correctly predicted the subsequent winner for fourteen out of sixteen post-World War II 
presidential elections. The two exceptions were President Kennedy’s victory in 1960 and 
President G.W. Bush’s victory in 2004 (his approval rating was 49.50 in the previous 
quarter)
4
. The economic variables used in the solved restricted model to predict the 
election outcome are shown in Table 8. Assumptions are made using a normal economic 
scenario and a more optimistic scenario. With the normal economic scenario, the last 
quarter approval rating is 47.2 with the incumbent party not winning the 2016 election. 
With the more optimistic scenario, the last quarter approval rating is 49.7 with the 
incumbent party, Democratic Party, also not winning the 2016 election. The results are 
displayed in Table 9. However, note that the S.E.R. on the regression is between two to 
four percent, meaning one standard deviation could swing the election outcome. 
With the second approach, the election win is predicted using the Keil-Lin Model 
forecasted approval ratings, ideology of the opposition candidate, and economic 
variables. Silver accounts for an average of the approval ratings for the year before the 
election, which is 46.5 forecasted from the Keil-Lin Model. A range of ideology from 20 
to 50 score is assigned to the opposition candidate, and a range of economic scenarios is 
used in the Silver Model. The results are shown in Table 10. As long as the Republican 
Party does not choose a candidate less than 40 for ideology, Silver predicts a Democratic 
win. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 This rule predicted Al Gore winning the 2000 election, which had it been popular vote, would have 
predicted the election correctly. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The winner of the 2016 election is uncertain. At this point, Hilary is not a shoo-in 
winner and it is an open election. When examining the determinants of vote shares for a 
political party, economic variables such as GDP, inflation, and unemployment are 
influential. However, this prediction takes into account of candidate personality that is 
manifested through the ideology score. Examining only the forecasted economic 
variables for the 2016 election, the election winner would be a Republican candidate. 
However, when the candidate is a determinant, then there are scenarios when the 
Democratic Party candidate will win.  
 Although the model generally explains approval ratings during most quarters, 
there are shortcomings to the model as revealed through the stability analysis using the 
QLR test. When analyzing the stability of the solved restricted model with the QLR test, 
there were occasional quarters that would violate the five percent significance level. The 
quarter two of 1981 has a sudden increase in approval ratings, which can be explained by 
President Reagan being shot during that quarter. Another instant when the model is 
unstable is during President H.W. Bush’s administration. His approval ratings increased 
in the beginning of his term but steadily declined since then. This behavior violates the 
model as the coefficients for him are higher than the model’s predictions. Further 
research can be conducted to explain the quarters when approval ratings do not match 
with the Keil-Lin Model.  
Though voting functions and popularity functions on a national level are 
examined, another possibility is to explore how swing states predict the election outcome. 
Swing states occur in states where no single candidate or political party has clear support 
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in the state’s Electoral College votes. By identifying the swing states for the 2016 
election and the determinants for the vote share of the swing states, it can predict the 
election outcome. 
 Another area of further research is predicting the Electoral College votes. In my 
model, approval ratings translate to popular votes, which correlates to the election 
winner. However, it does not explicitly account for Electoral College votes that can be 
different from popular votes, as can be seen in the 2000 election with President W. Bush 
and Democratic candidate Al Gore. By analyzing electoral votes in the state level and 
aggregating each state’s winner to a national level, it should better predict election 
outcomes. 
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Figure 1: Okun’s Law Showing the Relationship between GDP and 
Unemployment Rate 
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Figure 2: Presidential Approval Ratings in the United States, 1950-2015 
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Figure 3: Relationship between ANES and Zaller Scores for Election 
Years 1972-2004 
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Figure 4: Relationship between Calculated ANES Scores and Zaller 
Scores  
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Figure 5: President Obama Approval Ratings, 2008-2015 
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Figure 6: QLR Test for Stability Analysis  
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Figure 7: Term Quarter Regression Coefficients 
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Figure 8: Change in President Regression Coefficients 
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Table 1: Ray Fair Forecasts 
  Normal   Boom   Slow Growth 
  
    
  
Growth 2.97   4.00   1.00 
  
    
  
Inflation 2.14 
 
2.14 
 
1.50 
  
    
  
Good news 
1
 6 
 
8 
 
2 
Good news 
2
 4 
 
6 
 
2 
  
    
  
Forecast 
1
 48.70 
 
51.20 
 
44.00 
Forecast 
2
 46.80   49.40   42.10 
Source: Ray Fair 
     1if adjust post-publication for Good news 2.2% not 3.2% 
  2if post-publication 
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Table 2: Ray Fair Model of Vote Share of Democrats 
Growth 3.00 
    
Inflation 2.60 
    
Good news  6 
    
Forecast 1 48.50 
Forecast 2 44.81 
Source: Ray Fair, 
UCLA Anderson Forecast  
1
using Ray Fair model t=1916-2012 
2
using Ray Fair model t=1948-2012 
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Table 3: Republican Candidates Ideology Score 
 
 
Source: Claremont Colleges Professors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Candidate
Respondent 
(1)
Respondent 
(2)
Respondent 
(3)
Average
Jed Bush 20 49 80 49.7
Mark Rubio 40 65 85 63.3
Donald Trump 65 99 80 81.3
Ben Carson 75 95 90 86.7
Carly Fiorina 50 75 85 70.0
Ted Cruz 90 89 90 89.7
Rand Paul 80 70 80 76.7
John Kasich 10 50 80 46.7
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Table 4: Nate Silver Model Predictions 
Ideology 50 
 
 
Ideology 60 
 
 
 
Ideology 70 
 
 
 
Ideology 80 
 
  
                     Econ
Popularity
Normal Boom Slow Growth
40 51.30 52.52 48.98
50 54.60 55.82 52.28
60 57.90 59.12 55.58
                     Econ
Popularity
Normal Boom Slow Growth
35 53.70 54.92 51.38
45 57.00 58.22 54.68
55 60.30 61.52 57.98
                     Econ
Popularity
Normal Boom Slow Growth
40 56.10 57.32 53.78
50 59.40 60.62 57.08
60 62.70 63.92 60.38
                     Econ
Popularity
Normal Boom Slow Growth
40 58.50 59.72 56.18
50 61.80 63.02 59.48
60 65.10 66.32 62.78
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Table 5: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test  
Variables 
t-statistics 
Gallup -4.58 
Gallup - Gallup t-1 -4.58 
Log(GDP) -2.08 
Log(GDP) - Log(GDP) t-1 -10.87 
UR -3.96 
UR - UR t-1 13.34 
      Source: Author 
 
Table 6: Granger Causality Test 
Variables 
F-statistics 
Gallup 2.08 
CPI 1.30 
UR 0.69 
      Source: Author 
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Table 7: Regression Analysis of Gallup Poll Ratings for Keil-Lin Model  
  
(1) (2) 
Regressor 
      
Gallup t-1 0.620*** 0.62*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Log(CPI) -64.96 -35.91* 
  (52.49) (21.22) 
Log(CPI) t-1 -34.10 -86.77* 
  (85.30) (44.99) 
Log(CPI) t-2 147.30  173.6* 
  (95.98) (44.99) 
Log(CPI) t-3 -80.47 -86.77* 
  (89.26) (44.99) 
Log(CPI) t-4 29.18  35.91* 
  (56.00) (21.22) 
UR 0.31    
  (1.30)   
UR t-1 -2.07 -1.28*** 
  (1.85) (0.37) 
UR t-2 1.24    
  (1.87)   
UR t-3 -2.66   
  (1.80)   
UR t-4 1.833*   
  (1.08)   
Log(GDP) 127.7*** 67.44*** 
  (45.47) (15.68) 
Log(GDP) t-1 -59.69   
  (56.23)   
Log(GDP) t-2 -7.60   
  (56.87)   
Log(GDP) t-3 -124.8** -67.44*** 
  (55.87) (15.68) 
Log(GDP) t-4 73.04    
  (46.54)   
Years 1950-2015 1950-2015 
Time effects? yes yes 
State effects? yes yes 
  
 
  
F-Statistics Testing Exclusion of Groups of Variables   
Time effects=0   4.22 
State effects=0 
 
1.77 
Observations 258 258 
R
2
 0.93  0.93 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dummy variables included to control for events and change in administration. See Appendix for detailed 
explanation of variables not listed. Regression (1) is the unrestricted form and regression (2) is the solved 
restricted form. 
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Table 8: Keil-Lin Model Forecast Assumptions 
Normal Economic Condition 
Variables 3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16 
GDP 3.00 3.20 3.10 3.20 3.30 
UR 5.30 5.00 4.90 4.80 4.70 
Inflation 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 
        Source: UCLA Anderson Forecast 
Optimistic Economic Condition 
Variables 3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16 
GDP 2.10 3.50 4.00 4.00 4.00 
UR 5.30 4.90 4.80 4.70 4.60 
Inflation 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
        Source: UCLA Anderson Forecast, adjusted for current quarter outlook 
 
Table 9: Keil-Lin Model Forecast Results using Assumptions 
Quarter Normal Optimistic 
2015: III 45.94 46.73 
2016: I 46.32 48.03 
2016: II 46.74 48.95 
2016: III 47.17 49.65 
Average 46.54 48.34 
           Source: Author 
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Table 10: Nate Silver Model Forecast using Keil-Lin Model Approval 
Ratings 
                     Econ 
Ideology
 
Normal   Boom   Slow Growth 
30 48.66   49.88   46.34 
  
 
  
 
    
40 51.06   52.28   48.74 
            
50 53.46   54.68   51.14 
            
60 55.86   57.08   53.54 
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Appendix: Definition of Variables 
Variable Abbreviation Variable Definition 
ANES Scores American National Election Studies: ideology 
score in the Silver model. Data calculated from 
ANES survey for every election year from 1972 
to 2004. It surveyed voters to rank a candidate's 
ideology on a scale of one to seven with one 
being extremely liberal and seven being 
extremely conservative. 
D[name of president] Presidential personality: dummy variables that 
take a president’s inherent popularity for the 
respective administrations. 
Dnp[name of president] New party: dummy variables that occur during a 
change in political party which occurs in 1953: I, 
1961: I, 1969: I, 1977: I, 1981: I, 1993: I, and 
2009: I. 
Events 
Dummy variables for events such as Vietnam 
War, Kuwait, 9/11 attack, and Watergate 
Scandal. Vietnam War has a value of one from 
1964: III to 1972: IV and has a negative 3.37 
regression coefficient. Kuwait variable has a 
value of 3, 2, 1 in 1991: I, 1991: II, 1991: III 
respectively. This is to capture the magnitude of 
the effects of the invasion in Kuwait. There is a 
7.98 positive regression coefficient. 9/11 attack 
has a positive 10.74 regression coefficient and 
occurs with a value of 2, 1 in 2001: IV, 2002: I 
respectively. Watergate Scandal has a value of 
one from 1973: II to 1974: II and has a negative 
7.92 regression coefficient. 
Gallup t,(t-1) 
Gallup poll ratings and the lag of Gallup poll 
ratings. This is the percent of respondents who 
answer "approve" to the Gallup question. It is 
quarterly data taken from the UCSB database. 
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Log(CPI)t Consumer Price Index: economic variable for 
the measure of inflation as seasonally adjusted 
change in the CPI from one quarter to the next. 
In my model, inflation enters as the natural log 
of CPI and as an acceleration term, i.e. the 
difference between the inflation rate of the 
previous quarter and the quarter before that. CPI 
data is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, "FRED Database."  
Log(GDP)t Gross Domestic Product: economic variable for 
seasonally adjusted change in real GDP each 
quarter. In my model, GDP enters as the natural 
log of GDP and as an acceleration term, i.e. the 
difference between GDP of the previous quarter 
and the quarter before that. GDP data is from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "FRED 
Database." 
T[number of quarters in presidential term] 
Term quarter: honeymoon dummy variable that 
takes a value of one for every term quarter. This 
controls for time effects.  
URt Unemployment rate: economic variable of actual 
unemployment rate from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, "FRED Database." 
Zaller Scores 
Ideology score provided by John Zaller from 
UCLA. Data collected from "Floating Voters in 
U.S. Presidential Election, 1948-2000." 
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